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Abstract. This paper examines the existence and adequacy of implemented Computerized Accounting 
Information Systems (CAIS) security controls to prevent, detect and correct security breaches in Saudi 
organizations. An empirical survey, using a self-administered questionnaire, was carried out to achieve this 
purpose. Five hundred questionnaires were distributed on a random sample of Saudi organizations. Two 
hundred and seventy five valid, usable questionnaires were collected and analyzed. The results of the study 
highlight a number of inadequately implemented CAIS security controls, and some suggestions and 
recommendations are introduced to strengthen the weak points and to close the loopholes in the present CAIS 
security controls in Saudi organizations. From a practical standpoint, managers, auditors, IT users and 
practitioners alike stand to gain from the findings of this study. The results could enable them to better 
understand and secure their CAIS and to champion IT development for the success of their businesses. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Information has become one of the most valuable assets for most organizations. Business 
survival and success are heavily dependent upon the accuracy, integrity and continued 
availability of critical information. The reliance on information and continuous changes 
in technology force organizations to implement security controls to protect their 
Computerized Accounting Information Systems (CAIS) against potential security 
threats. However, the failure to secure the CAIS and the information they contain or to 
make it available when it is required can, and does, lead to great financial and non-
financial losses. It is argued that individuals who are more aware of the potential security 
threats against their CAIS would be more sensitized to the dangers of inadequate 
security controls and would more likely feel that their CAIS security is unsatisfactory. 
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However, many organizations do not realize the importance of CAIS security until some 
unauthorized access to their systems occurs or modification, alteration or destruction of 
their critical files has happened. Organizations can no longer disregard the importance of 
information security in the light of computer fraud, hackers and computer viruses. 
Accordingly, the need to understand and employ adequate security controls over CAIS 
has become an issue no business can ignore [3, 4, 11, 16, 26, 29, 30, 31, 38]. 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Middle East and the 12th 
largest in the world, measuring approximately 2.2 million square km, has been selected 
as the location in which to conduct the current survey. It also has the largest gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economy, 
having the largest reserves of petroleum in the world (26 percent of the proven reserves), 
ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in OPEC. The 
kingdom has launched a wave of cautious economic reforms aimed among others, at 
diversifying its oil-based economy and joining the WTO, which is evidence of its efforts 
to succeed in the fast approaching era of global integration [27, 39]. Saudi Arabia has a 
dynamic interaction between traditional culture and modern economic and business 
realities, which make Saudi Arabia a unique culture [49] in which to implement the 
current study. 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi economy can be considered as a “one-crop economy,” 
which relies basically on oil exports for its revenues. However, there is a dramatic shift 
in the economy of Saudi Arabia. While the phenomenal boom experienced by the Saudi 
economy came to its standstill during the Gulf War, the economy managed to regain its 
strength recently, and it is expected to be one of the strongest economies in the world. 
Several commodities ranging from fertilizer to pipes to furniture are produced in plants 
located at various industrial estates throughout the Kingdom. In order to remain 
competitive, computerization has become a necessity rather than a luxury for these 
manufacturers. Furthermore, service organizations need computerization more than ever 
before to improve their performance, satisfy their customers’ needs, and to reduce 
operating costs without compromising service quality [12, 47, 48, 49]. 
 
It is argued that while Saudi Arabia is rich in capital, it has had and continues to 
have an inadequate local supply of computer specialists. In an attempt to close the 
supply-demand gap in native computer specialists, and to acquire the contemporary 
computer know-how, over the years Saudi students were sent abroad (particularly to the 
United States) to obtain their education and to bridge the gap of a good domestic supply 
of computer specialists. In spite of this, Saudi computer and IT education is still not 
coping with an increasing demand for computer professionals [12, 49]. Recently 
however, the education authorities responsible for higher education have moved to 
reconsider the curriculum to meet business demands for more graduates who can cope 
with global business changes [5]. 
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The main objective of this study is to investigate and evaluate the existence and 
adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations in order to 
prevent, detect and correct CAIS security breaches. The current study also aims to 
investigate if there are significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding the 
implemented CAIS security controls. 
 
An empirical survey has been carried out on a random sample of Saudi 
organizations, using a self-administered questionnaire, to achieve the research 
objectives. The current study is an attempt to investigate the following two research 
questions: 
x Are there adequate security controls implemented to protect CAIS against 
the perceived security threats in Saudi organizations? 
x Are there significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding 
implemented CAIS security controls?   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the 
literature review and previous studies related to security controls of CAIS. This is 
followed by the statement of research hypotheses. The study’s research method is then 
described. This is followed by the presentation and analysis of the study’s major 
empirical results. The final section of this paper provides conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A review of the literature reveals diverse views regarding the classification of 
CAIS security controls. Security controls of CAIS could be classified according to their 
purpose: to deter, prevent, detect and correct security threats. The objective of deterrent 
security controls is to create an atmosphere of control compliance, while preventative 
security controls should be designed to reduce the possibility of an attack. Once a system 
has been violated, detective controls could help in identifying the occurrence of harm 
and security breaches. Corrective controls serve to reduce the impact of the threat after a 
loss has occurred. Thus, the purpose of corrective controls is to aid in recovery from 
damage or in reduction of the harmful effects of its occurrence [3, 37].  
 
Security controls can also be categorized according to their association with the 
data processing stages: e.g. input, processing, storing and output security controls. The 
purpose of input controls is to ensure that each transaction is authorized, processed 
correctly and processed only once. Processing controls should be used to ensure that 
transactions entered into CAIS are valid and accurate, that external data are not lost or 
altered and that invalid transactions are reprocessed correctly. Output security controls 
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are used to ensure that no unauthorized copies of output were made, and that the 
printouts are directed only to authorized individuals. Storage security controls ensure 
that all stored data and programs are secured against unauthorized access, manipulation, 
alteration and disclosure. Alternatively, security controls could also be classified 
according to their nature, including for example, organizational, physical access, data 
and data integrity, software, off-line programs and data security controls. 
 
Reviewing the literature reveals a paucity of studies concerned with evaluating 
the security controls of CAIS in developing countries, which represents a relatively new 
area for research. Boockholdt [6] examined the impact on computer security and data 
integrity of linking personal computers in user departments with the corporate 
mainframe computer. Eighty-five Certified Information Systems Auditors were surveyed 
to investigate their views regarding data security and integrity. The results of the study 
reveal that access and physical security controls, data backup and maintenance of 
hardware have become critical. Security classification of data should be established and 
different access restrictions for each classification should be implemented. Many of 
these security controls are included in our proposed CAIS security controls checklist to 
be tested in Saudi organizations [6].    
 
Buttross and Ackers [7] discussed microcomputer security exposure and 
microcomputer organizational, hardware, software and data security controls. They 
introduced a proposed security controls checklist that could be used to help internal 
auditors in identifying and correcting their CAIS security exposures through evaluating 
the security controls. The checklist included the following security control categories: 
organizational controls, hardware controls, software controls, and data and data integrity 
controls. The checklist was mainly designed for small and medium-sized organizations. 
Again, a selected number of security controls introduced by Buttross and Ackers [7] 
were incorporated in our proposed   checklist to be empirically investigated in the Saudi 
environment. 
 
Collier et al. [9] conducted research to explore how public service organizations 
assign responsibility for the prevention and detection of computer fraud. The results of 
the study revealed that most respondents considered that the specific responsibility for 
countering computer fraud was not consistently attributed within their organizations. 
Respondents mentioned that the information services function most commonly held the 
responsibility for computer fraud prevention and detection. However, 56 percent of the 
respondents considered the internal audit departments to be responsible for detecting and 
preventing computer fraud. 
 
In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Report [10] 
introduced a framework for the consideration of control risks, which expanded the focus 
of the traditional view of controls at the detailed account and assertion level to include a 
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global business perspective. The COSO framework was integrated into SAS 55 (1988) 
and 78 (1995). These standards direct the auditor to consider the broader business and 
control risks of a company, which can have a direct impact on potential misstatements in 
the financial statements or on appropriate disclosures [10]. 
 
The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) and the Information Systems Audit and 
Control Foundation (ISACA) [25] developed the Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology (COBIT). COBIT provides managers, auditors, and IT users with a 
set of generally accepted IT control objectives to assist them in maximizing the benefits 
derived through the use of IT and developing the appropriate IT governance and control 
in their organizations. The first edition of COBIT was published in 1996, the second 
edition in 1998, the third edition in 2000, and the on-line edition became available in 
2003. COBIT incorporates generally applicable and accepted international standards for 
good practice of IT management and control. Many of the COBIT security controls were 
selected and incorporated in the proposed checklist to be empirically tested in the Saudi 
business environment. 
 
ISO 17799 also introduces a comprehensive set of controls comprising best 
practices in information security. It is a recognized generic international information 
security standard. ISO 17799 was originally published in the early 1990's as the "DTI 
Code of Practice", by the Department of Trade & Industry in the UK. In 1995, it was 
further developed and published as BS 7799 by the British Standards Institute, which 
was updated again in 1999. The original BS 7799 was revised and reissued in September 
2002 [23, 24]. 
 
The ISO 17799 standard is comprised of ten main sections: security 
policy, system access control, computer & operations management, system development 
and maintenance, physical and environmental security, compliance, personnel security, 
security organization, asset classification and control, and business continuity 
management. Many of the security controls were also selected and incorporated in the 
proposed security controls checklist to be empirically investigated in the Saudi 
organizations.   
 
In December (2000), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established a joint technical committee 
named ISO/IEC. The committee developed and published the ISO/IEC 17799:2000 (The 
Code of Practice for Information Security Management), which is now considered as the 
international standard and the best practice for implementing security management. The 
standard was published in 2000 in its first edition, and updated in June 2005 [23, 24].  
 
Dougan [17] suggested an alternative internal control checklist for computer 
systems. This checklist could be used to check security controls in place and to ensure 
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that the implemented security procedures are adequate and effective to prevent computer 
data losses and security breaches. Dougan [17] grouped the security controls under four 
main categories, namely: computer room site (physical security), documentation, 
maintenance, and protection of data. According to Dougan, the suggested security 
checklist could be useful for those who have nothing; and for others it may serve as a 
prod to recheck their internal controls [17].  
 
Solms [40] has addressed the general background regarding CAIS security 
evaluations and has discussed the scope and responsibility for information security. His 
paper discusses a number of information security evaluation schemes and certification 
techniques, such as: Trusted Security Evaluation Criteria schemes, ISO 9000 (BS 570), 
the Code of Practice for Information Security Management, BS 7799, and Self 
Evaluation of Security Techniques. 
 
Henry [19] surveyed 261 companies in Hampton Roads, Virginia, USA, to 
determine the nature of their accounting systems and security in use. Henry [19] 
discussed and tested the following seven CAIS security methods: encryption, password 
access, backup of data, virus protection, authorization for system changes, physical 
system security, and periodic audits. The results of Henry’s survey [19] indicate that 
80.3 percent of the companies backup their accounting systems. 74.4 percent of the 
companies secure their accounting system with passwords, but only 42.7 percent utilize 
protection from viruses. Physical security and authorization for changes to the system 
are employed by less than 40 percent of the respondents. The survey results also show 
that only 15 companies use encryption for their accounting data. Almost 45 percent of 
the sample underwent some sort of audit of their accounting data. Selected security 
controls were incorporated in our proposed security controls checklist to be empirically 
investigated in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Qureshi and Siegel [37] discussed the responsibility of accountants regarding 
assuring the security of CAIS. The paper discussed the anticipated physical access and 
communication security controls, which include deterrent controls, preventive controls, 
detective controls, input controls and processing security controls. Many of the security 
controls introduced by Qureshi and Siegel [37] are selected to be empirically tested in 
the Saudi environment.  
 
Hood and Yang [21] studied the security of banking information systems in 
China. The results revealed that management was aware of security but the respondents 
believed that their banks had not taken enough action to reduce the potential risks and 
losses due to the lack of financial and human resources. Concerning security controls, 
two thirds of the respondents believed that their banking system could be protected from 
internal attack, while less than half were not confident about external attacks. Moreover, 
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it seems that passwords, daily backups, and monitoring of network activities were the 
most common security controls in the Chinese banking system.  
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [34] issued the 
“Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology 
Systems.” The document provides a baseline that organizations can use to establish and 
review their information technology security programs. Management, internal auditors, 
users, system developers, and security practitioners could use the guideline to gain an 
understanding of the basic security requirements most information technology systems 
should contain. In 1998, NIST [35] also issued the guide for developing security plans 
for information technology systems to improve protection of information technology 
resources. The purpose of the security plan was to provide an overview of the security 
requirements of the CAIS and to describe the controls in place or planned for meeting 
those requirements. The security plan also delineates responsibilities and expected 
behavior of all individuals who access CAIS. 
 
Zviran and Haga [50] carried out an empirical study to evaluate password security 
as one of the most common control mechanisms for authenticating users of CAIS. The 
study investigated the core characteristics of user-generated passwords and the 
associations among those characteristics. The results of the study revealed that despite 
the widespread use of passwords, little attention has been given to the characteristics of 
their actual use. The results also revealed that almost 50 percent of the users surveyed in 
this study reported passwords composed of five or fewer characters, the vast majority of 
respondents use only alphabetic characters and never changed their password. The 
findings also highlight the need to investigate the effectiveness of educational efforts to 
raise the security consciousness of system users.  
 
Dhillon [14] argued that many of the losses resulting from computer-related fraud 
could be avoided if organizations adopted a more pragmatic approach to dealing with 
such incidents. The paper encourages organizations to adopt a balanced approach to 
security controls which places equal emphasis on technical, formal and informal 
interventions against their computerized systems in order to minimize the losses of 
computer fraud. 
 
In 2000, the public oversight board (POB) [37] discussed the issue of unique risks 
and controls posed by increasingly sophisticated information processing systems. The 
board encouraged auditors to expand their knowledge of new business-oriented 
information systems, as such knowledge would facilitate the development of more 
effective audit approaches. The POB also recognized the need of attracting and retaining 
qualified technology specialists for audit support. 
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Dhillon and Backhouse [15] discussed the confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
responsibility, trust and ethicality principles as key factors for successful management of 
information security in the next millennium. Again, the paper recommended paying 
equal attention to technical and organizational security controls in designing and 
evaluating CAIS.  
 
Siponen [41] introduced a conceptual foundation for organizational information 
security awareness programs to minimize end-user errors and to enhance the 
effectiveness of implemented CAIS security controls. Siponen [41] emphasized the 
importance of information security awareness. He argued that prescribed information 
security techniques or procedures would lose their real usefulness if they were misused, 
misinterpreted, not used, or not properly implemented by end-users.  
 
Detecting and preventing unauthorized access to CAIS by internal and external 
parties has become an important issue. The results of Furnell and Dowland’s [18] study 
revealed that traditional methods of user authentication and access security control do 
not provide comprehensive protection and offer opportunities for compromise by various 
classes of abuse.  
 
Coffin and Patilis [8] studied the role of internal auditors in evaluating the 
security controls for protecting sensitive data in financial institutions such as banks, 
security firms, and insurance companies. They argued that internal auditing could 
significantly help organizations in determining and evaluating the implemented CAIS 
security controls as well as compliance with applicable regulations.  
 
White and Pearson [45] surveyed over two hundred US companies to investigate 
the security controls related to the personal use of computers, controlling e-mail 
accounts, and securing company data. The results of the study reinforced the need for 
better security control in the majority of surveyed companies. The results also revealed 
that many companies began to use computer technology before implementing 
appropriate safeguards; and the majority of the companies' safeguards continued to be 
lacking.  
 
Warren [44] carried out a survey to investigate the security practices of 
computerized information systems in three countries: Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.A. 
The paper attempted to evaluate security practices from different perspectives and to 
investigate whether the security practices varied from one country to another. The results 
of the survey revealed that: 
x In Australia, poor levels of computer security were found among 
Australian organizations. Many of the security problems were identified as 
implementation of poor security procedures. The results also indicated that 
45 percent of organizations do not budget for computer security.  
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x In the U.K., 42 percent of organizations did not have an information 
security policy. The findings also revealed that 49 percent of the 
organizations listed budget constraints as being an issue in implementing 
computer security.  
x In the U.S.A., theft of information and financial fraud cause the most 
financial damage. However, differences in the levels of CAIS abuses 
carried out by internal and external individuals were not significant. The 
paper suggested that U.S. security practices seem to be more effective than 
those of Australia or the U.K.  
 
Wright and Wright [46] conducted an exploratory study to obtain an 
understanding of the unique risks associated with the implementation of Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems using a semi-structured interview approach. The 
research findings showed that the potential for financial statement errors and business 
risks were intensified as a result of the lack of proper user training. The findings also 
showed that ongoing risks differed across ARP applications and across vendor packages. 
Finally, the results suggested that major firms use process audit techniques, as opposed 
to validation testing (i.e., they do not rely on tests of output), when hired to provide 
assurance on the risks for an ERP system. 
 
Recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology [36] in the U.S.A. 
issued its initial publication draft titled “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 
Information and Information Systems.” This publication establishes three potential levels 
of risk (low, moderate, and high) for each of the stated security objectives 
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) relevant to securing CAIS. The proposed 
levels of risk are more heavily weighted toward the impact of risk on the security of 
CAIS and the potential magnitude of harm than on the loss of confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of information. 
 
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) [42] performed a review at 
the Financial Management Service (FMS) during the period from October 2002 to June 
2003 to investigate whether FMS: (1) conducted a comprehensive security risk 
assessment and (2) documented and implemented appropriate security measures and 
controls for the system’s protection. The results of the GAO review [42] revealed that 
although FMS and the Federal Reserve implemented numerous security controls to 
protect their computing resources, risks were not sufficiently assessed, and numerous 
security control weaknesses were identified. Accordingly, immediate actions to correct 
the weaknesses and to promptly address new security threats and risks as they emerge to 
CAIS were highly recommended.  
 
Abu-Musa [3] carried out a survey to investigate the existence and adequacy of 
implemented CAIS security controls in the Egyptian banking sector (EBS). The results 
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of study revealed that the vast majority of Egyptian banks have adequate CAIS security 
controls in place. The results also revealed that the computer departments paid relatively 
more attention to technical security controls (such as: software and electronic access 
security controls, data and data entry security controls, off-line programs and data 
security controls, utility security controls, bypassing security controls, and user 
programming security controls); while internal audit departments emphasized the 
behavioral and organizational security controls (e.g. organizational security controls, 
division of duties, and output security controls). The study provides invaluable empirical 
results regarding inadequacies of implemented CAIS security controls, and introduces 
some suggestions to strengthen the security controls in the EBS. 
 
In a recent study, Hunton et al. [22] conducted an experiment to understand, 
assess and examine the extent to which financial auditors and information systems (IS) 
audit specialists recognize differences in the nature and unique business and audit risks 
associated with ERP systems, as compared with traditional computerized (non-ERP) 
systems. The research findings revealed that financial auditors were significantly less 
concerned about ERP risks compared to IS audit specialists. Moreover, IS audit 
specialists were less confident in financial auditors’ abilities to recognize the unique 
risks posed by ERP systems, which could have harmful effects on audit quality. 
 
It is observed that most of the previous studies in the CAIS security controls 
research area have been carried out in developed countries, but few studies have 
investigated CAIS security controls issues in developing countries. It is believed that 
conducting this research in a developing country such as Saudi Arabia, can yield fruitful 
results. 
  
 It is also observed that different authors have their own research agendas 
regarding the security aspects of CAIS. Accordingly, CAIS security controls have been 
investigated in a piecemeal rather than in an integrated fashion. The current study 
developed and tested an integrated and comprehensive checklist of CAIS security 
controls. The proposed checklist could be used by any organization to conduct a self-
evaluation of its CAIS security controls. The proposed checklist would help managers, 
internal and external auditors in identifying and correcting computer security exposures, 
and could enable them to evaluate the adequacy of implemented security controls. From 
a practical standpoint, managers and practitioners alike stand to gain from the findings of 
this study. The results enable managers and practitioners to better secure their CAIS and 
to champion information technology development for the success of their business. 
 
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
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The current research is an attempt to examine the following research hypotheses:   
H1: The implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations are inadequate. 
H2: There are no significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding the 
adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls. 
H3: There are no significant differences among different respondent groups regarding the 
adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in their organizations. 
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4.  Methodology 
 
In this study, an empirical survey – using a self-administered questionnaire – was 
conducted to investigate and evaluate the existence and adequacy of implemented CAIS 
security controls in Saudi organizations. The questionnaire was pre-tested on selected 
members of academic staff and accounting practitioners and was piloted on a selected 
sample of Saudi organizations. Comments and suggestions were considered in the 
development and revision of the final questionnaire. The questionnaire incorporated the 
proposed CAIS security controls check-list to be empirically investigated in Saudi 
organizations. The proposed checklist classified CAIS security controls under the 
following main security groups: organizational security controls, hardware and physical 
access security controls, software and electronic access security controls, data and data 
integrity security controls, off-line programs and data security controls, utilities security 
controls, bypassing of normal access security controls, user programming security 
controls, division of duties, output security controls, and periodic security controls.  
 
The proposed check-list used “Yes” or “No” questions to make it easy for 
respondents to answer these questions and to go through the security check-list. In order 
to increase the respondent’s motivation for completing the check-list, all questions that 
were similar in content and dealt with the same security control area or group were 
collected together under that specific security group. Also, to make it easy for 
respondents to answer its questions and go smoothly through the list the author 
meticulously considered the sequence and arrangement of the security controls in the 
check-list. Moreover, in deciding the order of the questions involved, the author tried to 
take advantage of the cognitive ties that the respondents would be likely to make among 
these groups.  
 
A number of security controls countermeasures involved in the proposed security 
controls check-list were adopted from established research and available literature in the 
information security area [3, 6, 7, 9, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28, 37]. Others, however, were 
specifically developed to meet the needs and requirements of this research. The final 
revised version of the questionnaire is used to survey the existence and implementation 
of CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations. The questionnaire is also used to 
collect the required information related to business and respondents profiles. 
 
Five hundred questionnaires randomly distributed to different types of Saudi 
organizations (Manufacturing companies, banks, insurance companies, retail 
merchandising; oil and gas companies, services companies, health care, government 
units, and others) in seven Saudi cities: Riyadh, Jeddah, Dhahran, Dammam, Thuqba, 
Khubar, and Jubeel. After the follow up, three hundred and five questionnaires – 
representing a 61 percent initial response rate – were collected. However, 30 incomplete 
questionnaires were excluded from the analysis. The respondents refused to complete the 
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questionnaires, claiming that they contained sensitive and confidential information. After 
excluding the incomplete and invalid responses, the research ended with 275 valid and 
usable questionnaires, representing a 55 percent response rate. This response rate is 
considered a relatively high response rate in this kind of empirical survey. 
 
A reliability test was carried out on the questionnaire using the Alpha Cronbach 
model, to explore its internal consistency, based on the average inter-item correlation. 
The result of the reliability test shows that the questionnaire design is highly reliable, 
and the collected data related to the implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi 
organizations are highly reliable and consistent (Alpha = 0.8735). The Student test was 
carried out investigates if there were any significant differences between early responses 
(190 questionnaires) and late responses (85 questionnaires). The results of the Student 
test show no significant differences between early and late responses (at significance 
level p 0.05), which provides evidence of a representative and unbiased selected research 
sample. 
 
The collected data show that 61 of the responding organizations were 
manufacturing companies and 41 were retail merchandising organizations, representing 
22.2 percent and 14.9 percent of the total responses respectively (Table I). 34 
respondents were banks – representing 12.4 percent of the total response. 25 respondents 
(9.1 percent) belonged to governmental units and 20 respondents (7.3 percent) were 
insurance companies. Moreover, 22 respondents (8 percent) were services organizations 
and 17 respondents (6.2 percent) were from the oil and gas industry. In addition, 18 
respondents, representing 6.5 percent of the total belonged to health care organizations 
(Table I). 37 respondents (13.5 percent of the total) belonged to other organizations, e.g. 
hotels, car rental organizations, décor and carpentry firms, publishing and printing 
organizations, accounting and auditing firms, construction companies, and design 
organizations. 
 
As (Table I) shows 99 respondents (36 percent) were accountants; 55 respondents 
(20 percent) were managers; 39 respondents (14.2 percent) were internal auditors; and 
36 respondents (13.1 percent) were controllers. Moreover, 20 respondents (7.3 percent) 
were working as cost accountants and four respondents were EDP auditors. Again, the 
respondents seem to be quite representative of the job structure in Saudi organizations. 
 
The collected data has been analyzed using the statistical package for social 
sciences (SPSS) version 12. Descriptive statistics (such as frequencies and percentages) 
of the collected data is performed to identify the main characteristics of the research 
variables. In addition, a non-parametric test (the Kruskal-Wallis test) is carried out to test 
the research hypotheses related to the existence and adequacy of implemented CAIS 
security controls in Saudi organizations.  Non-parametric tests – rather than parametric 
tests – are the most appropriate statistical tests for analyzing data collected in this 
research since these tests are “distribution free,” do not require normal distribution of 
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data, and can efficiently deal with small samples. Non-parametric tests are also very 
suitable to analyze nominal, ordinal, categorical, and scale ranked data [See: 1, 2, 13, 20, 
32, 33, 43].  
 
5.  Results 
 
The statistical findings of the existence and adequacy of implemented CAIS 
security controls as well as the significant differences among Saudi organizations and 
different respondent groups will be presented and discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.1 Organizational security controls 
To explore the existence and adequacy of the implemented organizational 
security controls in Saudi organizations, the respondents were given an organizational 
security controls checklist and they were asked to indicate the controls actually 
implemented in their organizations. A majority of the respondents (74.5 percent) 
believed that their organizations’ management has a serious and a positive attitude 
toward CAIS security. Almost two-thirds of the respondents (63.3 percent) indicated the 
existence and implementation of job rotation in their organizations to increase the chance 
of exposure of errors and irregularities. Moreover, 73.5 percent of the respondents 
agreed that their organizations’ personnel policies include background checks to reduce 
the likelihood of hiring dishonest employees (Table II). Slightly more than half of the 
respondents (approximately 55 percent) confirmed that their organizations’ employees 
are properly trained on their CAIS and that employees are aware of security issues; 
furthermore, these training programs are well documented. 
 
On the other hand, a relatively high proportion of the respondents (almost 66 
percent) believed that access to their organizations’ sensitive data is not restricted to 
those employees who have a special need to deal with them. Moreover, slightly more 
than half of the respondents (54.5 percent) believed that mandatory vacations are not yet 
implemented in their organizations, despite knowledge that mandatory employee 
vacations reduce the likelihood of fraud or embezzlement and increase the chance of 
their exposure.  
 
The result of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) reveals significant differences 
among the different Saudi organizations regarding the existence and adequacy of the 
implemented organizational security controls (p 0.05). Moreover, the statistical results of 
Kruskal-Wallis (Table XIII) show no significant differences in the opinions of different 
respondent groups regarding the same issue in their organizations (at significance level p 
0.05). 
 
Recommendation: According to the above results, it is recommended that 
measures should be taken to restrict access to organizations’ sensitive data to the 
authorized employees with defined needs. Mandatory vacations of employees should be 
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taken where not already implemented. Enhanced personnel policies, including the 
rotation of duties, could reduce the likelihood of organizations experiencing fraud or 
embezzlement by increasing the chance of their exposure. 
 
5.2 Hardware and physical access security controls 
The statistical results show that the majority of the respondents (82.5 percent) 
believed that the theft and hazard insurance covering their organizations’ computer 
hardware is adequate; 77.8 percent of the respondents indicated that access to their CAIS 
is limited and restricted to employees with defined needs (Table III). 
 
The findings also reveal that the vast majority of the respondents (82.9 percent) 
reported the existence of uninterruptible power supply units to supply power during 
power outages. Approximately 83 percent confirmed the existence of line co-
coordinators to smooth out power supply; and 79 percent of those respondents confirmed 
the existence of extinguishers close at hand in their organizations. A high proportion of 
the respondents confirmed the adequacy of implemented security controls to restrict 
physical access to their organizations’ computer terminals, to the computer room, to 
hardware outside the computer room (such as network switch-gear, or modems) and to 
communications lines (for example, cables sealed in ducts outside the hardware area to 
prevent tapping or reading by service equipment) (Table III). 
 
As Table III shows, 57.5 of the respondents indicated that their organizations’ 
computer systems are located in areas physically isolated from the sprinkler system, to 
avoid water damage. Moreover, to avoid potential pollutants (such as smoke, dust, food 
and coffee) no smoking, eating or drinking is allowed around the computers in the 
majority of Saudi organizations. Slightly more than half of the respondents (53.5 
percent) mentioned that waterproof covers are used in their organizations and merely 
half of the respondents believed that their organizations’ computers are installed in 
secured areas, which are locked and kept under surveillance when not in use. 
 
Table III also shows that a relatively high proportion of the respondents (61.1 
percent) affirmed the adequacy of security controls implemented over generating and 
revoking the means of permitting physical access to their accounting systems (by keys, 
security badges, combination numbers, switch cards). Moreover, un-issued physical 
access media are reported to be under security control and all physical access procedures 
are subject to adequate supervision by a responsible person. Further, 58.5 percent of the 
respondents confirmed that the individuals who are responsible for controlling physical 
access are entirely independent of those who are responsible for the programming, 
system software, and accounting control functions in their organizations. Approximately 
70 percent of the respondents confirmed that the above physical access procedures are 
subject to adequate supervision by a responsible official. 
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On the other hand, the majority of the respondents (76.5 percent) reported that 
their organizations’ computers were not bolted to the desks and 64.4 percent of the total 
mentioned that no lockable covers are placed on the organizations’ computers. However, 
many of them confirmed that they have disk-less computer machines. A high proportion 
of the respondents (almost 65 percent) confirmed the absence of internal trip alarms 
inside their computers. More than two-thirds of the respondents (almost 68.4 percent) 
revealed that neither alarms nor motion detectors are installed in areas with a high 
concentration of computer equipment in their organizations (Table III). 
 
According to the statistics of the Kruskal-Wallis tests (Table XII), it seems that 
there are no significant differences among Saudi organizations regarding the existence 
and implementation of the hardware and physical access security controls at significance 
level p 0.05. Again, the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics (Table XIII) show no significant 
differences among the opinions of different respondent groups regarding the existence 
and implementation of the hardware and physical access security controls in their 
organizations at p 0.05.   
 
Recommendation: Based on the previous empirical results, Saudi organizations 
are recommended to install alarms and motion detectors in areas with a high 
concentration of computer equipment. Installing computers only in areas that are locked 
and kept under surveillance when not in use, placing lockable covers on computers and 
bolting computer to desks or tables should be considered. Un-issued physical access 
badges and keys should be under adequate control and complete independence of 
individuals who are responsible for controlling physical access and those who are 
responsible for programming, system software, and accounting control functions should 
be considered. 
 
5.3 Software and electronic access security controls 
The statistical results in Table IV show that the majority of the organizations’ 
respondents (82.9 percent) confirmed the installation of virus protection software in their 
accounting systems and that software is updated regularly. The vast majority of the 
respondents (86.2 percent) also confirmed that all the software used is original and that 
adequate procedures are in place to avoid the use of bootleg software and unauthorized 
copying of licensed software. Moreover, all backups and working copies of software and 
data are well maintained. 
 
The vast majority of the respondents confirmed the existence of an adequate 
combination of software procedures and manual action to prevent unauthorized access 
and to report and investigate persistent attempts to bypass access controls. In addition, 
regular reports of unauthorized access are prepared and submitted to the organizations’ 
management. A high proportion of the respondents (more than 82 percent) confirmed 
that strong password systems are used to identify individuals to the system as authorized 
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users. Adequate security procedures are implemented to ensure that the passwords are 
periodically changed, kept secret, and could not easily be guessed. Passwords are 
typically immediately cancelled for terminated or transferred organization employees. 
From Table IV, it seems that there is adequate control over assigning access 
rights to appropriate individuals across Saudi organizations. Moreover, the majority of 
respondents confirmed the adequacy of the security controls implemented over granting 
and revoking authorized access on the system (such as user-IDs or passwords, access 
cards), allocating and withdrawing special facilities from users (for example, ability to 
use certain utilities, hierarchical levels of clearance) and protection of security tables 
stored on the system to verify authenticity (password control files, or communication 
control tables which can be one-way encrypted). 
 
Moreover, most of the respondents (around 73 percent) reported that access 
security control functions (such as granting or changing system identities, granting or 
changing the ability to use special facilities, changing passwords, or other identification 
codes) are themselves restricted to appropriate organization staff, who have no 
incompatible duties. Furthermore, these procedures are subject to adequate supervision 
by a responsible official in the organization (Table IV). On the other hand, the vast 
majority of the respondents (85.1 percent) indicated that the current insurance covers 
neither software nor the cost of business interruption resulting from a computer mishap.  
 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) show no significant differences 
among Saudi organizations regarding the existence of implementation of the software 
and electronic access security controls (at significance level p 0.05). On the other, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XIII) shows significant differences among the points of view 
of respondent groups regarding the existence and implementation of the software and 
electronic access security control counter-measures in their organizations (p 0.05).  
 
Recommendation: Accordingly, it is advisable to extend current insurance to 
cover software and the cost of business interruption resulting from a computer mishap in 
Saudi organizations. Adequate procedures should be implemented to prevent 
unauthorized public access to the organizations’ accounting information systems via 
dial-up (for example, by use of dial-back, and by dial-up access restricted to non-
confidential information). 
 
5.4 Data security controls 
The results reveal that the great majority of the respondents (83.3 percent) 
affirmed the adequacy of security controls over the manual handling of input and output 
data in their organization (Table V). Moreover, 84.4 percent of respondents indicated 
that their organizations’ data backups are routinely performed according to an 
appropriate schedule, at least daily for frequently updated data and monthly for 
infrequently changing data. Furthermore, all organization data backup media reportedly 
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have write protection in place. Again, the majority of the respondents confirmed that 
their organizations’ data diskettes and cartridges are stored in a very strong, secure 
cabinet or a fire-rated safe. Additional backup copies of the organizations’ data are 
usually kept in the nearest branch, for emergency and data recovery. According to 80 
percent of the respondents a hard copy of particularly critical data is routinely made and 
securely stored. More than two-thirds of the respondents (68.4 percent) indicated that the 
backup schedules include hard disk backups as well. 
 
Quite a high proportion of the respondents (67.3 percent) reported that unattended 
computers are turned off when data are removed from the system. Of the respondents, 64 
percent confirmed that dealing with sensitive data is performed in private offices and 
only by designated officers to reduce the likelihood of their exposure (Table V). More 
than 75 percent of the respondents indicated the existence of documented emergency 
plans, which specified the main steps that should be taken when the systems failed, as 
well as the individuals who are responsible for completion of these steps.  
 
On the other hand, a rather high proportion of the respondents (73.1 percent) 
reported that backups of sensitive data stored off-site are not encrypted to reduce the 
chance of unauthorized exposure. Moreover, around 58 percent of them indicated that 
data encryption has not been considered for sensitive data (such as the payroll, or 
organizations’ customer lists). Approximately 63 percent of the respondents reported 
that legally binding confidentiality agreements are not drafted by employers and signed 
by employees who have access to sensitive data (e.g., customer lists).  Moreover, 61 
percent of the respondents confirmed that the format command is not left off the hard 
disk and reformatting of disks or overwriting of the files is not a requirement for 
extraction of sensitive data in their organizations. Finally, approximately 64 percent of 
them indicated that their organizations had not designated an adequate custodian for 
sensitive data disks (Table V). 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test statistics show no significant differences among different 
organizations (Table XII) and respondent group views (Table XIII)  regarding the 
existence and implementation of data security controls counter-measures in the Saudi 
environment (at p 0.05).  
 
Recommendation: According to the above results, it is recommended that 
sensitive data stored off-site should be encrypted to reduce the chance of its 
unauthorized exposure, legally binding confidentiality agreements related to sensitive 
data should be enhanced and adequate provision for the custody of sensitive data disks 
and backups should be strengthened in Saudi organizations. 
 
5.5 Off-line programs and data security controls 
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Off-line computer software and backup copies of data and programs in the 
physical library are no less important than the working data and programs. The 
questionnaire data (Table VI) revealed that the majority of respondents (82.2 percent) 
confirmed the existence of adequate records to identify off-line programs and data stored 
in unique media, where each individual item has external labels for easy recognition.  
The findings also show that the majority of the respondents (76.4 percent) 
confirmed the adequacy of security controls over the issuing and returning of programs 
or data files to and from a physical computer library, either for installation or for disaster 
recovery. Furthermore, of the respondents, 78.9 percent indicated that the storage 
methods in their organizations to prevent unauthorized removal of stored data and 
programs are adequate and all the previous procedures are subject to adequate 
supervision by a responsible official in the organization (Table VI). On the other hand, 
more than two thirds of the respondents (68.7 percent) mentioned that the librarian 
functions in their organizations are not performed by individuals entirely independently 
of computer operation and programming responsibilities. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) provides strong evidence that there are no 
significant differences among different Saudi organizations. In contrast, the Kruskal-
Wallis test (Table XIII) shows significant differences among respondent groups 
regarding their opinions on the existence and implementation of off-line program and 
data security control counter-measures in Saudi organizations (at p 0.05). 
 
Recommendation: It can be concluded that better security controls should be 
implemented over the issuing and returning of program/data files to and from physical 
libraries. Moreover, the librarian functions should be performed by individuals who are 
entirely independent of computer operation and programming responsibilities. 
 
5.6 Utility security controls 
The results reveal that around two thirds of the respondents (66.3 percent) 
confirmed the adequacy of control procedures implemented to identify all utility 
programs and other special programs (which could be used, for example, to change 
application programs or data, by bypassing normal software access restrictions in their 
organizations). Approximately 55 percent of respondents agreed that the ability to use 
such programs is restricted to appropriate and authorized individuals in their 
organizations (Table VII). Moreover, 57.5 percent of the respondents confirmed the 
adequacy of implemented controls to log and report the use – or even attempt at use – of 
such programs. Furthermore, a regular review of such reports is reported to be carried 
out, usually by a responsible official in the organization, to determine and investigate 
any unauthorized access to the organization’s CAIS. 
 
According to the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) it seems that there are no 
significant differences among different organizations (at p 0.05) regarding the existence 
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and implementation of the utilities security control in Saudi organizations. On the other 
hand, the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XIII) shows significant differences among the 
opinions of different respondent groups regarding the existence and implementation of 
the utilities security control countermeasures in Saudi organizations (again, at 
significance level p 0.05).  
Recommendation: Based on the above results, more attention should be directed 
by Saudi organizations to strengthen utility security controls, to identify all utility 
programs or other special programs and to implement adequate security controls over the 
use, or even attempts at use, of such programs. 
 
5.7 Bypassing of normal access security controls 
Sometimes it becomes a necessity to bypass normal security controls, to achieve 
specific authorized tasks by internal or external individuals (emergencies, or 
maintenance of program libraries by outside software support, such as software vendors, 
through dial up). In these cases, it is very important to keep such actions under strong 
restrictive security control. The results reveal that 63.3 percent of the organizations’ 
respondents confirmed the existence of appropriate authorization procedures and 
adequate security controls for bypassing normal security controls (Table VIII). 
Approximately 61 percent of the respondents agreed on the adequacy of implemented 
security controls to prevent, investigate and report any unauthorized changes to their 
organizations’ data files. Moreover, adequate security controls are in place to ensure that 
security is subsequently reinstated whenever normal security controls are bypassed in 
cases of emergency. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) provides strong evidence that there are 
significant differences among Saudi organizations (at p 0.05), while no significant 
differences appear among different respondent groups (Table XIII) regarding the 
existence and implementation of the bypassing of normal access security controls in the 
Saudi environment (at significance level p 0.05).  
 
Recommendation: Stronger security should be implemented regarding the 
bypassing of normal access controls to prevent, investigate and report any unauthorized 
changes to organizations’ data files. Furthermore, adequate controls should be in place to 
ensure that security is subsequently reinstated whenever bypassing of normal security 
controls has occurred in emergency cases. 
 
5.8 User programming security controls 
High level programming languages could be used to change organizations’ data 
and manipulate programs and files. The results (Table IX) reveal that slightly more than 
half of respondents (56.4 percent) agreed on the existence and implementation of 
adequate security controls over the use of such programs. They confirmed the existence 
of appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized use of high level programming 
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languages, or even an attempt to use them. However, almost half of the respondents 
(48.4 percent) agreed that their organizations did not have adequate security controls in 
place to prevent and report unauthorized use of programs written by unauthorized users. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test provides strong evidence that there is a significant 
difference among both organization types (Table XII) and respondent groups (Table 
XIII) regarding the existence and adequacy of implemented user programming security 
controls in Saudi organizations (at p 0.05).  
 
Recommendation: The results suggest that there is a need to implement stronger 
security controls to prevent the unauthorized use of high level programming languages. 
Adequate security controls should be implemented to prevent and report unauthorized 
use of programs written by unauthorized users in Saudi organizations. 
 
5.9 Division of duties 
A high proportion of the respondents (70 percent) confirmed the segregation of 
incompatible accounting duties and tasks in their organizations (that is authorization, 
record keeping and custody). However, a similar segregation is also required regarding 
incompatible computer tasks, to reduce the likelihood of breaching CAIS security 
controls. A majority of the respondents (80.4 percent) agreed on the adequacy of the 
implementation of security controls to prevent computer operators, schedulers, data input 
staff, and other operations personnel from gaining access to program documentation and 
development libraries in their organizations. 
 
Almost 63 percent of the respondents indicated that computer programmers and 
development personnel are not allowed to gain access to the computer operations areas 
in their organizations. Further, 50.2 percent of the respondents agreed on the adequacy of 
the implemented security controls to prevent systems personnel who are responsible for 
cataloguing functions from gaining access to program documentation and development 
libraries and to prevent them from entering the operations area or performing computer 
operations functions in their organizations (Table X). 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) displays significant differences among 
different organizations regarding the existence and implementation of division of duties 
in Saudi organizations. However, it seems that there are no significant differences in the 
opinions of respondent groups (Table XIII) regarding the adequacy of the implemented 
security controls to prevent computer operators, schedulers, data input staff, and other 
operations personnel from gaining access to program documentation and development 
libraries in their organizations (at p 0.05). 
 
Recommendation: In the light of the above, it is suggested that Saudi 
organizations should pay more attention to the segregation of incompatible computer 
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tasks and duties. A clear and strict procedure should be put in place to prevent computer 
operators, schedulers, data input staff, and other operations personnel from gaining 
access to program documentation and development libraries. Moreover, systems 
personnel who are responsible for cataloging functions should be prevented from gaining 
access to program documentation and development libraries, as well as preventing them 
from entering the operations area or performing computer operations functions. 
 
5.10 Output security controls 
 The majority of the respondents (77.1 percent) confirmed that all sensitive data in 
their organization are secure and protected. Visual access to the organizations’ sensitive 
information is strongly controlled and restricted only to authorized users at the 
authorized time. Almost 71 percent of the respondents indicated that their organizations’ 
sensitive computer output is secured in a locked cabinet, and that strong security 
procedures are implemented whenever some of these sensitive data are printed outside 
the data centre or central computer room. According to the majority of respondents (72.7 
percent), shredding machines are available and used in their organizations for disposal of 
confidential and sensitive data. Moreover, this task is restricted to security-cleared 
individuals in the organization (Table XI).  
 
The vast majority of the respondents (almost 95 percent) confirmed that input to 
output reconciliation is adequately implemented in their organizations. A very high 
proportion of the respondents (87.6 percent) reported that all their organizations’ hard 
copy documents and output are automatically date and time-stamped. Moreover, 78.2 
percent of the respondents confirmed the adequacy of the implemented security controls 
over printing, copying and distributing of their computer output and reports. Further, all 
the previous tasks are restricted to the authorized individuals in the organization. In 
addition, random output/input comparisons are regularly carried out to verify correct 
processing. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test (Table XII) provides strong evidence that there are 
significant differences among organizations regarding the adequacy of implemented 
output security controls in Saudi organizations (at significance level p 0.05). 
Furthermore, it seems that there are significant differences among respondent groups 
(Table XIII) regarding the existence and implementation of the output security control 
counter-measures in their organizations (again at p 0.05). 
 
Recommendation: According to the above results, it seems that, while the 
majority of the respondents in the Saudi organizations confirmed the adequacy of 
implemented security controls over printing, copying and distributing its output, more 
adequate output security controls should be put in place and directed to secure and 
protect sensitive organization data across Saudi organizations. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper an empirical survey was carried out to investigate the existence and 
adequacy of implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi organizations. The paper also 
investigates the significant differences among different Saudi organizations as well as 
among respondent groups regarding the above research issues. The statistical results 
highlighted a number of inadequately implemented CAIS security controls in Saudi 
organizations and accordingly, some suggestions to eliminate these weak points are 
recommended. 
 
According to the survey results, it is recommended to restrict access to 
organizations’ sensitive data to the authorized employees with defined needs. Mandatory 
vacations of employees should be considered and enhanced personnel policies, including 
the rotation of duties should be enhanced. It is recommended that alarms and motion 
detectors should be installed in areas with a high concentration of computer equipment. 
Installing computers only in areas that are locked and kept under surveillance when not 
in use, placing lockable covers on computers and bolting computer to desks or tables 
should be considered. Further, un-issued physical access badges and keys should be 
under adequate control. Restrictions on the complete independence of individuals who 
are responsible for controlling physical access and those who are responsible for 
programming, system software, and accounting control functions should also be 
considered. 
 
Adequate procedures should be implemented to prevent unauthorized access 
CAIS. Moreover, sensitive data stored off-site should be encrypted to reduce the chance 
of its unauthorized exposure; legally binding confidentiality agreements related to 
sensitive data should be enhanced and adequate custody of sensitive data disks and 
backups should be strengthened in Saudi organizations.  
 
Adequate security controls should be implemented over the issuing and returning 
of program/data files to and from physical libraries. Librarian functions should be 
performed by individuals who are entirely independent of computer operation and 
programming responsibilities. More attention should be directed by Saudi organizations 
to strengthen utility security controls, to identify all utility programs or other special 
programs and to implement adequate security controls over the use, or even attempted 
use, of such programs. Stronger security should be implemented in the bypassing of 
normal access controls to prevent, investigate and report any unauthorized changes to 
organizations’ data files. Furthermore, adequate controls should be in place to ensure 
that security is subsequently reinstated whenever bypassing of normal security controls 
has occurred in emergency cases. 
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Segregation of incompatible computer tasks and duties should be considered. A 
clear and strict procedure should be put in place to prevent computer operators, 
schedulers, data input staff, and other operations personnel from gaining access to 
program documentation and development libraries. Moreover, systems personnel who 
are responsible for cataloging functions should be prevented from gaining access to 
program documentation and development libraries, as well as preventing them from 
entering the operations area or performing computer operations functions. Moreover, 
adequate output security controls should be put in place and directed to secure and 
protect sensitive data across Saudi organizations. 
Further investigation could be undertaken to extend and improve this research. 
The intention of the current research has been to evaluate the security controls of CAIS 
in Saudi organizations. However, more research is needed to obtain evidence from other 
developing countries in the Middle East and Gulf countries. Comparative studies could 
be carried out to investigate the significant differences between developing and 
developed countries regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of implemented CAIS 
security controls. Investigating the differences in the opinions of CAIS programmers and 
designers, internal auditors, external auditors and CAIS operational staff could be 
potential avenues for future research. 
 
 Evaluating the Security Controls of CAIS in Saudi Organizations:: . . . 
 
91
 
References 
 
[1] Abu-Musa, A. A. (2004a), “The Threats of Computerized Accounting Information Systems: An 
Empirical Study on Saudi Organizations”, The Public Administration Journal, The Public 
Administration Institute, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 509 – 570.  
[2] Abu-Musa, A. A.  (2004b), “Investigating The Security Policies of Computerized Accounting 
Information Systems in the Banking Industry of an Emerging Economy: The Case of Egypt”, The 
Business Review of Information Systems, USA, Summer. Vol. 8, Number 3, pp. 83 -102. 
[3] Abu-Musa, A. A.  (2004c), “Investigating the Security Controls of CAIS in an Emerging Economy: An 
Empirical Study on Egyptian Banking Industry”, The Journal of Managerial Auditing, UK, Vol. 19, 
Iss.2, pp. 272 -302. 
[4] Abu-Musa, A. A.  (2002), “Computer Crimes: How Can You Protect Your Computerized Accounting 
Information System”, The Journal of American Academy of Business, Cambridge, USA, Vol. 2. No.1 
September 2002, pp. 91-11. 
[5] Al-Sudairy M. A., and N. K. Tang (2000), "Information Technology in Saudi Arabia’s Supermarket 
Chains", International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 28 No.8, pp. 341-356. 
[6] Boockholdt, J. L. (1989), “Implementing Security and Integrity in Macro-Mainframe Networks”, MIS 
Quarterly, (June), PP.135 -144. 
[7] Buttross, T. E. and M. D. Ackers (1990), “A Time - Saving Approach To Microcomputer Security”, 
Journal Of Accounting & EDP, (Vol. 6, Iss. 1), pp. 31 - 35.  
[8] Coffin, R. G. and C. Patilis (2001), The Internal Auditor’s Role in Privacy, Internal Auditing, Mar/Apr., 
(Vol.16, Iss.2), PP. 22-28. 
[9] Collier, Paul; Rob Dixon and Claire Marston (1991), “The Role of Internal Auditor in the Prevention 
and Detection of Computer Fraud”, Public Money & Management, (Winter), PP. 53 - 61.   
[10] Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 1992. Internal Control: 
Integrated Framework (COSO, New York). 
[11] Crockett, B. (1993), “Banks Are Leaders in Computer Security”, American Banker, (Nov.), p. 20. 
[12] Curtiss, R.H. (1995), “Four years after massive war expenses Saudi Arabia get its second wind,” The 
Washing ton Re port on Middle East Affairs, (September), pp.48- 52. 
[13] Dickinson (1990), Statistical Analysis in Accounting and Finance, Philip Allan, London. 
[14] Dhillon, G. (1999), “Managing and controlling computer misuse”, Information Management & 
Computer Security, (Vol. 7, Number 4), PP. 171-175. 
[15] Dhillon, G. and J. Backhouse (2000), “Information Systems Security Management in the New 
Millennium”, Association for Computing Machinery, Communication of the ACM, New York, 
(Vol. 43, Iss. 7), PP. 125-129.  
[16] Doost, R. K. (1990), “Accounting Irregularities And Computer Fraud”, National Public Accountant, 
(Vol. 35 Iss. 5), pp. 36 - 39. 
[17] Dougan, J. (1994), “Internal Control Checklist for Hospitality Computer Systems”, Bottom Line, (Vol. 
9, Iss. 5), pp. 8 - 11. 
[18] Furnell, S.  M., P. S. Dowland (2000), “A conceptual architecture for real-time intrusion monitoring”, 
Information Management & Computer Security, (Vol. 8, Iss. 2), PP.65-75.  
[19] Henry, L.; (1997), “A Study of the Nature and Security of Accounting Information Systems: The Case 
of Hampton Roads, Virginia”, The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business, (Vol. 33, Iss.  63) PP 171-189. 
[20] Hessler R. M, 1992, Social Research Methods, West Publishing Company, New York, USA.  
[21] Hood, K. L. and Jie-Win Yang (1998), “Impact of Banking Information Systems Security on Banking in 
China: The Case of Large State-Owned Banks in Shenzhen Economic Special Zone- An Introduction”, 
Journal of Global Information Management, (Vol. 6, No. 3) PP 5- 15. 
[22] Hunton, J.; A. Wright; and S. Wright, (2004), "Are financial auditors overconfident in their ability to 
assess risks associated with enterprise resource planning systems? Journal of Information Systems, (Vol. 
18, No. 2), PP. 7-28.  
 [23] Information Security Management, Part2: Specification for Information security management systems 
AS/NZS 7799.2:2003, BS 7799.2:2002 
Ahmad A. Abu-Musa 
 
92 
 
[24] Information Technology – Code of practice for Information Security Management AS/NZS ISO/IEC 
17799:2001 
[25] Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation (ISACF); (1998); Control Objectives for 
Information and Related Technology (COBIT); (ISACF, Rolling Meadows, Il). 
[26] International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), Information Technology Committee, (1998), 
International Information Technology Guidelines: Managing Security of Information,  (January), New 
York. 
[27] Jasimuddin, S. (2001), "Analyzing the competitive advantages of Saudi Arabia with Porter's model", 
Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Vol. 16 No.1, pp.59-68.  
[28] Jenkins, B.; P. Cooke; and P. Quest (1992), An Audit Approach to Computers, (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, Moorage Place, London). 
[29] KPMG (2000), Information Security Survey 2000, Executive Summary, April, KPMG, London. 
[30] Mau, S.; and J. Catlin (1993), “Systems Security In 90’s”, Interpreter, (January), pp. 8-9. 
[31] Meall, L. (1992), “Computer Crime: Foiling the Fraudsters”, Accountancy, (November), pp. 56-57. 
[32] Melville S and W. Goddard (1996) Research Methodology: An Introduction for Science and 
Engineering Students, Juta and Co. Ltd, Kenwyn. 
[33] Miller, D. C. (1991) Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, (Fifth Edition), SAGE 
Publications, London. 
[34] National Institute of Standards and Technology (1996), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems , 
September.  
[35] National Institute of Standards and Technology (1998), Federal Computer Security Program, Managers’ 
Forum Working Group, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems,  
Special Publication 800-18, December.  
[36] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2003), Computer Security Division, Information 
Technology Laboratory, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information 
Systems, Initial Publication Draft, Version 1.0, May. 
[37] Public Oversight Board (POB). 2000. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness: Report and Recommendations, 
2000, www.pobauditpanel.org. 
[37] Qureshi, A. A. and J. G. Siegel (1997), “The Accountant And Computer Security”, The National Public 
Accountant, Washington, May, (Vol. 43, Iss. 3), pp. 12-15. 
[38] Rockwell, R. (1990), “The Advent of Computer Related Crimes”, Secured Lender, (Jul /Aug), pp. 40 - 
42 
[39] Sohail M., and O. Al-Abdali (2005), "The usage of third party logistics in Saudi Arabia Current position 
and future prospects", International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 35 
No. 9, pp. 637-653.  
[40] Solms, Rossouw Von (1996), “Information Security Management: The Second Generation”, Computer 
& Security (UK), pp. 281 - 288.  
[41] Siponen, M. T. (2000), “A conceptual Foundation for Organizational Information Security Awareness”, 
Information Management and Computer Security, Bradford, (Vol. 8, Iss. 8), PP. 31- 44. 
[42] The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) (2003), Information Security: Computer Controls 
over Key Treasury Internet Payment System, Report to Congressional Requesters, July. 
[43] Wackerly, D. D., W. Mendenhall and R. L. Scheaffer (1996) Mathematical Statistics with Applications, 
Duxbury Press, Wadsworth Publishing Company, London. 
[44] Warren, M. J. (2002), Security practice: survey evidence from three countries, Logistics Information 
Manageme, (Vol. 15, Iss. 5/6), PP. 347-351. 
[45] White, G. W. and S. J Pearson (2001) “Controlling corporate e-mail, PC use and computer security”; 
Information Management & Computer Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 2/3; pp. 88-93. 
[46] Wright, S. and A. Wright (2002), “Information system assurance for enterprise resource planning 
systems: Implementation and unique risk considerations”, Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 16, 
Supplement, pp. 99-113. 
 Evaluating the Security Controls of CAIS in Saudi Organizations:: . . . 
 
93
 
[47] Yavas, U. and M. Yasin (1994), Manufacturing versus Service Organizations: An Investigation of 
Informational and Operational Interactions in the International Domain" Industrial Management & Data 
Systems, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 24-29.  
[48] Yavas, U. (1997), "Management Know-How Transfer To Saudi Arabia: A Survey of Saudi Managers", 
Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 97, No. 7, pp. 280-286.  
[49] Yavas, U. and M. Yasin (1999) "Organizational Significance and Application of Computer Skills: A 
Culturally- Based Empirical Examination", Cross cultural Management – An International Journal, 
Volume 6 Number 4. 
[50] Zviran, M., and W. J. Haga, (1999), “Password Security: An Empirical Study”, Journal of Management 
Information Systems, Vol.15, Iss.4; pp. 161-185. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ahmad A. Abu-Musa 
 
94 
 
Appendixes 
 
Table I. The research sample  
The Research Sample According to 
Business Type 
The Research Sample According to 
Respondents Type 
Type of Business Frequency Percent Job Title Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing 61 22.2 Internal Auditor 39 14.2 
Banking 34 12.4 Staff Accountant 99 36.0 
Insurance 20 7.3 Cost Accountant 20 7.3 
Retail Merchandising 41 14.9 Controller 36 13.1 
Services 22 8.0 EDP Auditor 4 1.5 
Government 25 9.1 Manager 55 20.0 
Oil 17 6.2 Other 22 8.0 
Health Care 18 6.5    
Other 37 13.5    
Total 275 100.0 Total 275 100.0 
 
Table II. Organizational security controls 
Organizational Security Controls 
Exist Do Not Exist 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Management attitude toward the security 
of the computerized accounting information 
system as reflected by its actions is 
appropriate. 
 
205 
 
74.5 
 
70 
 
25.5 
2- Rotation of duties is utilized to increase 
the chance of exposure of errors and 
irregularities. 
174 63.3 101 36.7 
3- Mandatory vacations used to reduce the 
likelihood of fraud or embezzlement 
resulting from increased chance of exposure.  
125 45.5 150 54.5 
4- Personnel policies include background 
checks to reduce the likelihood of hiring 
dishonest employees. 
202 73.5 73 26.5 
5- There is documentation showing that users 
have been properly trained. 
151 54.9 124 45.1 
6- The employees who have access to 
sensitive data have been bonded. 
94 34.2 181 65.8 
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Table III. Hardware and physical access security controls 
Hardware and Physical Access Security 
Controls 
Exist Do Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Adequate theft and hazard insurance covering 
computers’ hardware.  
227 82.5 48 17.5 
2- Limiting computer access to employees with 
a defined need. 
214 77.8 61 22.2 
3- Installing computers only in areas that are 
locked and kept under surveillance when not 
in use. 
140 50.9 135 49.1 
4- Bolting computer to desks or tables. 65 23.6 210 76.5 
5- Placing lockable covers on computers. 98 35.6 177 64.4 
6-Installing alarms and motion detectors in areas 
with high concentration of computer equipment. 
100 36.4 175 64.6 
7- Placing internal trip alarms inside computers. 87 31.6 188 68.4 
8- Line co-coordinators to smooth out power.  228 82.9 47 17.1 
9- Un-interruptible power supply units to supply 
power during power outages. 
231 84 44 16 
10- Extinguishers exist and close at hand. 217 78.9 58 21.2 
11- Placement of computers away from the 
sprinkler system to avoid  water damage. 
158 57.5 117 42.5 
12- Waterproof covers to avoid water damage 147 53.5 128 46.5 
13- Implementation of a smoking ban, or use of 
small fans around the computer to blow any 
smoke away from the system. 
172 62.5 103 37.5 
14- Avoidance of other potential pollutants (e.g., 
dust, food, and coffee) around the computer. 
197 71.6 78 28.4 
15- There are adequate controls to restrict 
physical access to the following: 
    
A. terminals, 202 73.5 73 26.5 
B. computer room, 211 76.7 64 32.3 
C. hardware outside the computer room (e.g. 
network switch-gear, modems),  
182 66.2 93 33.8 
E. communications lines (e.g., cables should be 
sealed in ducts outside the hardware area to 
prevent tapping or reading by service 
equipment). 
191 69.5 84 30.5 
16- Adequate controls over:     
A. generating and revoking the means of 
permitting physical access (e.g. key, security 
badge, combination number, switch card); 
168 61.1 107 38.8 
B. where applicable, un-issued physical accesses 
permit badges or keys? 
146 53.1 129 46.9 
17- The person responsible for controlling 
physical access should be independent of 
programming, system software, and accounting 
control functions. 
161 58.5 114 41.5 
18- The previous physical access procedures are 
subject to adequate supervision by a  responsible 
official. 
192 69.8 83 30.2 
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Table IV.  Software security & access security controls 
Software Security and Access  Security 
Controls 
Exist Do Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Virus protection software should be installed. 228 82.9 47 17.1 
2- Sensitive data transmitted  should be 
encrypted. 
151 54.9 
124 45.1 
3- The present insurance  should cover software. 119 43.3 156 56.7 
4- Insurance extended to cover the cost of 
business interruption  resulting from a computer 
mishap. 
41 14.9 234 85.1 
5- Backups and working copies of software and 
data are well maintained. 
243 88.4 32 11.6 
6- Software backups, like originals, should have 
write-protect tabs in place. 
237 86.2 38 13.8 
7- Originals placed in an off –site storage (e.g., a 
safe-deposit box or the home of the owner or 
chief executive officer). 
163 59.3 112 40.7 
8- Adequate steps should be taken to avoid 
unauthorized copying of licensed software. 
209 76 66 24 
9- Adequate steps should be taken to avoid the 
use of bootleg software. 
218 79.3 57 20.7 
10- There is an adequate combination of software 
procedures and manual action to: 
    
A. prevent unauthorized accesses, report and 
investigate persistent attempts to bypass  the 
access controls,  or 
230 83.6 45 16.4 
B. report and investigate unauthorized accesses. 233 84.7 42 15.3 
11- Are there controls over:     
A. assigning access rights to appropriate  
individual in the organization, 
206 74.9 69 25.1 
B. granting and revoking authorized access on the 
system (e.g., user -IDs  or   passwords, switch 
cards, visa cards), 
204 74.2 71 25.8 
C. allocating and withdrawing special facilities 
from users (e.g., ability to use certain utilities, 
higher levels of clearance in a hierarchy), 
195 70.9 80 29.1 
D. protecting the security tables stored on the 
system, which are used by the system to verify 
authenticity (e.g., password control files, 
communication control tables can be one-way 
encrypted). 
197 71.6 78 28.4 
12. Passwords (or other codes) are used to 
identify individuals to the   system  as 
authorized users; are there adequate procedures 
to ensure that the passwords are: 
    
A. periodically changed, 226 82.2 49 17.8 
B. kept secret ( e.g., not written down or 
displayed on screen), 
231 84.0 44 16.0 
C. not easily guessed, and 227 82.5 48 17.5 
D. cancelled for terminated or transferred 
employees. 
227 82.5 48 17.5 
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Software Security and Access  Security 
Controls 
Exist Do Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
13- Adequate procedures should be implemented  
to ensure the ability to use the following access 
control functions are itself restricted to 
appropriate staff with no other incompatible 
duties: 
    
A. granting or changing systems identities, 199 72.4 76 27.6 
B. granting or changing the ability to use special 
facilities, 
210 76.4 65 23.6 
C. changing passwords or other identification 
codes. 
194 70.5 81 29.5 
14- Adequate procedures should be implemented 
to prevent unauthorized public access via dial-up 
(e.g. use dial-back, dial-up access restricted to 
non-confidential information). 
159 57.8 116 42.2 
15-All the above procedures should be subject to 
adequate supervision by a responsible 
organization’s official. 
203 73.8 72 26.2 
 
Table V. Data security controls 
Data Security Controls Exist Do Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Security controls implemented over manual 
handling of input and output data among the 
organization’s departments are adequate: 
229 83.3 46 16.7 
2- Data backups should be routinely prepared. 232 84.4 43 15.6 
3- Backups are being performed on schedule 
where: 
    
A.  at least daily for frequently updated data, 232 84.4 43 15.6 
B. at least monthly for data that changes 
infrequently. 
241 87.6 34 12.4 
4- Data backups should  have write-protect tabs in 
place. 
203 73.8 72 26.2 
5- A copy of backups should be placed in an off-
site storage. 
148 53.8 127 46.2 
6- Backups of sensitive data that are stored off-
site should be encrypted to reduce the chance of 
unauthorized exposure. 
74 26.9 201 73.1 
7- A hard copy should be routinely printed for 
particularly critical data. 
220 80.0 55 20.0 
8- Hard disks include an external hard disk or 
cassette tape as a backup 
188 68.4 87 31.6 
9- The FORMAT command should  be  left off 
the hard disk 
107 38.9 168 61.1 
10- Data encryption should be considered for 
sensitive data (e.g., payroll). 
116 42.2 159 57.8 
11- Work on sensitive data should be limited to 
private offices to reduce the likelihood of 
exposure. 
176 64.0 99 36.0 
12- The organization should have designated 100 36.4 175 63.6 
Ahmad A. Abu-Musa 
 
98 
 
Data Security Controls Exist Do Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
adequate custody for sensitive data disks. 
13-Unattended computers should be turned off 
when data is removed from the system. 
185 67.3 90 32.7 
14- Reformatting of the disk or overwriting of the 
file should be required for extraction of sensitive 
data. 
122 44.4 153 55.6 
15-Legally binding confidentiality agreements 
should be drafted by employers and signed by 
computer users with access to sensitive data (e.g., 
customer lists). 
102 37.1 173 62.9 
16- Diskettes or cartridges should be stored in a 
secure cabinet or fire-rated safe. 
270 98.2 5 1.8 
17- A documented emergency plan should state:     
 
Table VI. Off-line programs and data security controls 
Off-line Programs and Data Security Controls Exist Not Exist 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Where programs and data, including back-up 
copies, are physically controlled: 
    
   A. Adequate records should be kept to identify 
programs/ data uniquely (e.g.  external labels) 
226 82.2 49 17.8 
   B. Adequate security controls should be 
implemented over  issuing and returning of 
programs/data files: 
    
x to and from the physical library, 210 76.4 65 23.6 
x to and from the store to be used for 
recovery in the event of a  disaster,  
210 76.4 65 23.6 
x to and from the installation , 210 76.4 65 23.6 
   C. Storage methods should prevent the 
unauthorized removal of programs/data 
217 78.9 58 21.1 
2- The librarian function should be performed by a 
person independent of computer operation and 
programming responsibilities 
86 31.3 189 68.7 
3- The above procedures should be subject to 
adequate supervision by a responsible official 
217 78.9 58 21.1 
 
Table VII. Utility security controls 
Utility Security Controls Exist Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1-If utilities or other special programs could be 
used to change application programs/ data by 
bypassing normal software access restrictions: 
    
 A. Adequate procedures should be implemented 
to identify all programs with this  special status, 
182 66.2 93 33.8 
 B. The ability to use such programs should be 
restricted to appropriate , authorized personnel 
in  the organizations 
151 54.9 124 45.1 
 C. Adequate security controls to log and report     
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Utility Security Controls Exist Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
the use, or attempted use, of such programs 
should be implemented. A review of such 
reports should be performed by a responsible 
official to determine and investigate 
unauthorized access. 
 
158 57.5 117 42.5 
 
Table VIII. Bypassing of normal access security controls 
 
Bypassing of Normal Access Security Controls Exist Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Where it is necessary to bypass normal security 
controls ( e.g. emergencies or maintenance of 
program libraries by outside software support, 
such as vendor, through dial up): 
    
   A. is there appropriate authorization before or 
after the event, 
174 63.3 101 36.7 
   B. are there adequate controls to :     
1-ensure that security is subsequently 
reinstated, 
167 60.7 108 39.3 
2-prevent or report and investigate 
unauthorized changes to data? 
160 
58.2 115 41.8 
 
Table IX. User programming security controls 
User Programming Security Controls Exist Not Exist 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Where users are permitted to use utilities or 
high level programming languages which can 
change data:- 
    
  A- Adequate security controls should be 
implemented to   prevent the unauthorized use 
of this facility, and to report and investigate 
unauthorized use or attempts to use it, 
155 56.4 120 43.6 
 B- - Adequate security controls should be 
implemented to prevent and report 
unauthorized use of programs written by 
unauthorized user. 
142 51.6 133 48.4 
 
 
Table X. Division of duties security controls 
Division of Duties Exist Not Exist 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- Is a segregation of accounting duties (i.e., 
authorization, record keeping, and custody) 
good and adequate? 
191 69.5 84 30.5 
2- Are there adequate controls to prevent:     
    A. Computer operators, schedulers, data input 
staff, and other operations personnel from 
221 80.4 54 19.6 
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Division of Duties Exist Not Exist 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
gaining  access to program documentation and 
development libraries, 
   B. Development personnel from gaining access 
to the computer  operations area,  
172 62.5 103 37.5 
   C. Systems implementation personnel 
responsible for cataloguing function from 
gaining access to program documentation and 
development libraries, and from entering the 
operations area or performing computer 
operations functions? 
138 50.2 137 49.8 
 
Table XI. Output security controls 
Output Security Controls Exist Not Exist 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1. Visual access to sensitive information should be 
controlled and restricted only to the authorized 
users in the authorized time. 
212 77.1 63 22.9 
2. Printing of sensitive data outside the data centre or 
central computer room should be under security 
controls 
195 70.9 80 29.1 
3. Sensitive computer output should be secured in a 
locked cabinet 
206 74.9 69 25.1 
4. Hard copy output should be automatically 
date/time stamped. 
241 87.6 34 12.4 
5. Adequate controls should be implemented over the 
distribution of computer output and reports 
215 78.2 60 21.8 
6. Copying of computer output  should be restricted 
to authorized individuals in the organization 
218 79.3 57 20.7 
7. Adequate security controls should be implemented 
over printed copies of data / information  
206 74.9 69 25.1 
8. Printing and distribution of data and information 
done should be under proper security controls, and 
only by authorized persons in the organization. 
182 66.2 93 33.8 
9. Shredding machines should be available and used 
for disposal of confidential data 
225 81.8 50 18.2 
10. Shredding of sensitive documents should be 
restricted to security cleared personnel. 
200 72.7 75 27.3 
11. Input to output reconciliation should be 
implemented. 
261 94.9 14 5.1 
12. Random output / input comparisons should be 
regularly done to verify correct processing. 
239 86.9 36 13.1 
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Table XII. The Results of kruskal wallis test according to business type 
 
Organizational 
Security 
Controls 
Hardware 
Security 
Controls 
Software 
Security 
Controls 
Data 
Security 
Controls 
Off-line Data & 
Program Security 
Controls 
Chi-Square 22.498 14.581 14.649 12.474 13.109 
df 8 8 8 8 8 
Asymp. Sig. .004 .068 .066 .131 .108 
 
 
Utility 
Security 
Controls 
Bypassing 
Security 
Controls 
User 
Programming 
Security Controls 
Division  
of Duties 
Output 
Security 
Controls 
Chi-Square 12.386 15.700 26.644 31.156 29.403 
df 8 8 8 8 8 
Asymp. Sig. .135 .047 .001 .000 .000 
 
 
Table XIII. The Results of Kruskal Wallis test according to respondents type 
 
Organizational 
Security Controls 
Hardware 
Security 
Controls 
Software 
Security 
Controls 
Data 
Security 
Controls 
Off-line Data & 
Program Security 
Controls 
Chi-Square 4.401 9.366 21.103 7.057 21.235 
df 6 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. .623 .154 .002 .316 .002 
 
 
Utility 
Security 
Controls 
Bypassing 
Security 
Controls 
User 
Programming 
Security Controls 
Division of 
Duties 
Output 
Security 
Controls 
Chi-Square 13.848 8.322 31.121 9.065 17.073 
df 6 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. .031 .215 .000 .170 .009 
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 ﻧﻈﻢ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﻴﺔ اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ ﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ اﻟﻀﻮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﻴﺔ ﻷﻣﻦ
 ﻣﻴﺪاﻧﻴﺔدراﺳﺔ  :اﻟﻤﻨﺸﺄت اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ ﻓﻰ
 
 أﺣﻤﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺴﻼم أﺑﻮ ﻣﻮﺳﻰ
 ﻗﺴﻢ اﶈﺎﺳﺒﺔ وﻧﻈﻢ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻹدارﻳﺔ
 ، اﻟﻈﻬﺮان، اﳌﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﳌﻠﻚ ﻓﻬﺪ ﻟﻠﺒﱰول واﳌﻌﺎدن
 
 
 م(٦٠٠٢/٤٠/٨٠م؛ وﻗﺒﻞ ﻟﻠﻨﺸﺮ ﰲ ٥٠٠٢/٠١/٨٠)ﻗّﺪم ﻟﻠﻨﺸﺮ ﰲ 
 
ﳊﻤﺎﻳﺔ  ﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ وﺟﻮد وﻣﺪى ﻛﻔﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻀﻮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﻴﺔ اﳌﻄﺒﻘﺔﻳﻬﺪف ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﱃ .  ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ
 ﻣﻴﺪاﻧﻴﺔوﻟﻘﺪ ﻗﺎم اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﺑﻌﻤﻞ دراﺳﺔ  أﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﻢ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﶈﺎﺳﺒﻴﺔ اﻹﻟﻜﱰوﻧﻴﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻨﺸﺄت اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ.
وﻟﻘﺪ ﰎ ﺗﻮزﻳﻊ  إﺳﺘﻘﺼﺎء ﻣﻌﺪة ﺧﺼﻴﺼﺎ ًﳍﺬا اﻟﻐﺮض. ﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﺨﺪﻣﺎ ًﰱ ذﻟﻚ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔاﻟ تﻨﺸﺄاﳌﻋﻠﻰ 
، ﺣﻴﺚ ﰎ ﲡﻤﻴﻊ وﲢﻠﻴﻞ ﻋﺪد اﳌﻨﺸﺄت اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻴﻨﺔ ﻋﺸﻮاﺋﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ إﺳﺘﻘﺼﺎء ﻋﺪد ﲬﺴﻤﺎﺋﺔ
 اﻟﺪراﺳﺔﺎﺋﺞ ﻧﺘ ﻇﻬﺮتوﻟﻘﺪ أﻣﻜﺘﻤﻠﺔ وﺻﺎﳊﺔ ﻷﻏﺮاض اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻞ.  ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ إﺳﺘﻘﺼﺎء ﻣﺎﺋﺘﲔ وﲬﺲ وﺳﺒﻌﲔ
أﻣﻦ واﳌﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﲝﻤﺎﻳﺔ  تﻨﺸﺄاﻟﻀﻮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﻴﺔ اﳌﻄﺒﻘﺔ ﰱ ﺗﻠﻚ اﳌﻋﺪدًا ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮاﺣﻰ اﻟﻘﺼﻮر وﻋﺪم ﻛﻔﺎﻳﺔ 
وﻟﻘﺪ ﻗﺪﻣﺖ  ﺔ اﻟﱴ ēﺪد أﻣﻦ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻨﻈﻢ.ﻔﻠﺨﺘاﳌ ﺿﺪ اﳌﺨﺎﻃﺮ ﻧﻈﻢ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﶈﺎﺳﺒﻴﺔ اﻹﻟﻜﱰوﻧﻴﺔ
 اﳋﺎﺻﺔ اﻟﻀﻮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﻴﺔ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﺪدا ًﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﱰﺣﺎت واﻟﺘﻮﺻﻴﺎت اﻟﱴ ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﺗﺴﻬﻢ ﰱ ﺗﺪﻋﻴﻢ وﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ
. وﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎﺣﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﺈن ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﶈﺎﺳﺒﻴﺔ اﻹﻟﻜﱰوﻧﻴﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻨﺸﺄت اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔﺄﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﻢ ﺑ
اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﺳﻮف ﲤﻜﻦ ﻣﺪﻳﺮى اﳌﻨﺸﺄت واﳌﺮاﺟﻌﲔ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﲔ واﳋﺮﺟﻴﲔ وﻏﲑﻫﻢ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻬﻨﻴﲔ وﻣﺴﺘﺨﺪﻣﻰ 
ﺒﻴﺔ اﻹﻟﻜﱰوﻧﻴﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﶈﺎﺳﻣﻦ ﻓﻬﻢ وﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ أﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﻢ  ﻧﻈﻢ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﶈﺎﺳﺒﻴﺔ اﻹﻟﻜﱰوﻧﻴﺔ
واﻟﺘﻌﺮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻮاﺣﻰ اﻟﻘﺼﻮر đﺎ، وﻣﻦ ﰒ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ إﲣﺎذ اﻟﻘﺮرات اﻟﺘﺼﺤﻴﺤﻴﺔ اﳌﻨﺎﺳﺒﺔ  اﳌﻨﺸﺄت اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ
 . . . ::snoitazinagrO iduaS ni SIAC fo slortnoC ytiruceS eht gnitaulavE 
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اﻷﻣﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻠﻚ اﻟﻨﻈﻢ ﲟﺎ ﳛﻘﻖ اﻹﺳﺘﻔﺎدة اﳌﺜﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ  اﻟﻀﻮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻼﰱ أوﺟﻪ اﻟﻘﺼﻮر اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ، وﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ
 .ﰲ اﳌﻨﺸﺄت اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت 
